البحث عن بادئة BGP

أدخل بادئة (أو عنواناً واحداً). يُجاب من نسختنا اليومية من جدول التوجيه العالمي.

أمثلة:

83.110.0.0/15

رؤية جامع واحد (APNIC). المسار الذي يُرشَّح قبل وصوله إلى ذلك الجامع لا يُدرج.

معلنة كما هي

83.110.0.0/15AS5384EMIRATES TELECOMMUNICATIONS GROUP COMPANY (ETISALAT GROUP) PJSCRPKI صالح83.110.0.0

السجل: RIPE NCC · الإمارات العربية المتحدة · 20‏/01‏/2004
الكتلة المفوَّضة: 83.110.0.0 – 83.111.255.255

المسارات المغطّية

لا يغطيها أي مسار أقل تحديداً.

المسارات الأكثر تحديداً

14 مساراً أكثر تحديداً من 3 نظاماً مستقلاً مُنشئاً

83.110.0.0/17AS5384EMIRATES TELECOMMUNICATIONS GROUP COMPANY (ETISALAT GROUP) PJSCRPKI صالح83.110.0.0
83.110.0.0/18AS5384EMIRATES TELECOMMUNICATIONS GROUP COMPANY (ETISALAT GROUP) PJSCRPKI صالح83.110.0.0
83.110.64.0/18AS5384EMIRATES TELECOMMUNICATIONS GROUP COMPANY (ETISALAT GROUP) PJSCRPKI صالح83.110.64.0
83.110.128.0/17AS5384EMIRATES TELECOMMUNICATIONS GROUP COMPANY (ETISALAT GROUP) PJSCRPKI صالح83.110.128.0
83.110.128.0/18AS5384EMIRATES TELECOMMUNICATIONS GROUP COMPANY (ETISALAT GROUP) PJSCRPKI صالح83.110.128.0
83.110.192.0/18AS5384EMIRATES TELECOMMUNICATIONS GROUP COMPANY (ETISALAT GROUP) PJSCRPKI صالح83.110.192.0
83.111.0.0/16AS5384EMIRATES TELECOMMUNICATIONS GROUP COMPANY (ETISALAT GROUP) PJSCRPKI صالح83.111.0.0
83.111.0.0/17AS8966EMIRATES TELECOMMUNICATIONS GROUP COMPANY (ETISALAT GROUP) PJSCRPKI صالح83.111.0.0
83.111.0.0/18AS5384EMIRATES TELECOMMUNICATIONS GROUP COMPANY (ETISALAT GROUP) PJSCRPKI صالح83.111.0.0
83.111.28.0/24AS19905Vercara, LLCRPKI صالح83.111.28.0
83.111.64.0/18AS5384EMIRATES TELECOMMUNICATIONS GROUP COMPANY (ETISALAT GROUP) PJSCRPKI صالح83.111.64.0
83.111.128.0/17AS8966EMIRATES TELECOMMUNICATIONS GROUP COMPANY (ETISALAT GROUP) PJSCRPKI صالح83.111.128.0
83.111.128.0/18AS5384EMIRATES TELECOMMUNICATIONS GROUP COMPANY (ETISALAT GROUP) PJSCRPKI صالح83.111.128.0
83.111.192.0/18AS5384EMIRATES TELECOMMUNICATIONS GROUP COMPANY (ETISALAT GROUP) PJSCRPKI صالح83.111.192.0

هذا النص غير متوفر بعد باللغة العربية. يُعرض باللغة الإنجليزية إلى أن تُنشر ترجمة.

On the internet, routes are announced as prefixes: an autonomous system tells its neighbours via BGP that it can deliver traffic for, say, 2.48.0.0/14. This tool looks a prefix up in our daily copy of the global routing table and shows three things:

Exact announcements: which AS originates exactly this prefix. More than one origin (a MOAS) is normal for anycast services and some multihomed networks, and suspicious otherwise.
Covering routes: less-specific announcements that contain it. Traffic follows the most specific route, so a covering route matters if the more-specific one disappears.
More-specifics: announcements inside it, which may belong to other networks (customers, or a hijack).

Each announced route is also checked against the RPKI: whether a ROA authorises its origin AS.

The table is the view from APNIC’s route collector. Most of the global table is the same from everywhere, but a route that is filtered before it reaches that collector will not appear.

الأسئلة الشائعة

Why is my /24 not listed but a /16 is?

Your addresses are announced as part of the larger block, and no one announces the /24 separately. That is the normal case for most customers of a provider.

What is a more-specific hijack?

Someone announces a longer prefix inside your space. Because routers prefer the most specific route, traffic goes to them. RPKI with a strict max length makes such announcements invalid.

Can I enter a single address?

Yes. The tool then shows the most specific announced route that contains it.

الأسئلة الشائعة

ذو صلة