البحث عن بادئة BGP
أدخل بادئة (أو عنواناً واحداً). يُجاب من نسختنا اليومية من جدول التوجيه العالمي.
2408:8656::/32
معلنة كما هي
- 2408:8656::/32AS17816China Unicom IP network China169 Guangdong provinceRPKI صالح2408:8656::
- السجل
- APNIC · الصين · 31/05/2012
- الكتلة المفوَّضة
- 2408:8400:: – 2408:87ff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff
المسارات المغطّية
لا يغطيها أي مسار أقل تحديداً.
المسارات الأكثر تحديداً
- 2408:8656::/36AS17622China Unicom Guangzhou networkRPKI صالح2408:8656::
- 2408:8656::/39AS17622China Unicom Guangzhou networkRPKI صالح2408:8656::
- 2408:8656:200::/39AS17622China Unicom Guangzhou networkRPKI صالح2408:8656:200::
- 2408:8656:400::/39AS17622China Unicom Guangzhou networkRPKI صالح2408:8656:400::
- 2408:8656:458::/48AS17622China Unicom Guangzhou networkRPKI صالح2408:8656:458::
- 2408:8656:600::/39AS17622China Unicom Guangzhou networkRPKI صالح2408:8656:600::
- 2408:8656:800::/39AS17622China Unicom Guangzhou networkRPKI صالح2408:8656:800::
- 2408:8656:858::/48AS17622China Unicom Guangzhou networkRPKI صالح2408:8656:858::
- 2408:8656:a00::/39AS17622China Unicom Guangzhou networkRPKI صالح2408:8656:a00::
- 2408:8656:a52::/48AS9929CHINA UNICOM Industrial Internet BackboneRPKI صالح2408:8656:a52::
- 2408:8656:a58::/48AS17622China Unicom Guangzhou networkRPKI صالح2408:8656:a58::
- 2408:8656:c00::/39AS17622China Unicom Guangzhou networkRPKI صالح2408:8656:c00::
- 2408:8656:e00::/39AS17622China Unicom Guangzhou networkRPKI صالح2408:8656:e00::
- 2408:8656:1000::/37AS17622China Unicom Guangzhou networkRPKI صالح2408:8656:1000::
- 2408:8656:1000::/39AS17622China Unicom Guangzhou networkRPKI صالح2408:8656:1000::
- 2408:8656:1058::/48AS17622China Unicom Guangzhou networkRPKI صالح2408:8656:1058::
- 2408:8656:1200::/39AS17622China Unicom Guangzhou networkRPKI صالح2408:8656:1200::
- 2408:8656:1400::/39AS17622China Unicom Guangzhou networkRPKI صالح2408:8656:1400::
- 2408:8656:1600::/39AS17622China Unicom Guangzhou networkRPKI صالح2408:8656:1600::
- 2408:8656:22cf::/48AS9929CHINA UNICOM Industrial Internet BackboneRPKI صالح2408:8656:22cf::
- 2408:8656:2c00::/39AS17623China Unicom Shenzen networkRPKI صالح2408:8656:2c00::
- 2408:8656:2e00::/39AS17623China Unicom Shenzen networkRPKI صالح2408:8656:2e00::
- 2408:8656:3000::/39AS17623China Unicom Shenzen networkRPKI صالح2408:8656:3000::
- 2408:8656:3200::/39AS17623China Unicom Shenzen networkRPKI صالح2408:8656:3200::
- 2408:8656:3400::/39AS17623China Unicom Shenzen networkRPKI صالح2408:8656:3400::
- 2408:8656:3600::/39AS17623China Unicom Shenzen networkRPKI صالح2408:8656:3600::
- 2408:8656:3800::/39AS17623China Unicom Shenzen networkRPKI صالح2408:8656:3800::
- 2408:8656:3800::/40AS17623China Unicom Shenzen networkRPKI صالح2408:8656:3800::
- 2408:8656:3a00::/39AS17623China Unicom Shenzen networkRPKI صالح2408:8656:3a00::
- 2408:8656:3c00::/39AS17623China Unicom Shenzen networkRPKI صالح2408:8656:3c00::
هذا النص غير متوفر بعد باللغة العربية. يُعرض باللغة الإنجليزية إلى أن تُنشر ترجمة.
On the internet, routes are announced as prefixes: an autonomous system tells its neighbours via BGP that it can deliver traffic for, say, 2.48.0.0/14. This tool looks a prefix up in our daily copy of the global routing table and shows three things:
- Exact announcements: which AS originates exactly this prefix. More than one origin (a MOAS) is normal for anycast services and some multihomed networks, and suspicious otherwise.
- Covering routes: less-specific announcements that contain it. Traffic follows the most specific route, so a covering route matters if the more-specific one disappears.
- More-specifics: announcements inside it, which may belong to other networks (customers, or a hijack).
Each announced route is also checked against the RPKI: whether a ROA authorises its origin AS.
The table is the view from APNIC’s route collector. Most of the global table is the same from everywhere, but a route that is filtered before it reaches that collector will not appear.
الأسئلة الشائعة
Why is my /24 not listed but a /16 is?
Your addresses are announced as part of the larger block, and no one announces the /24 separately. That is the normal case for most customers of a provider.
What is a more-specific hijack?
Someone announces a longer prefix inside your space. Because routers prefer the most specific route, traffic goes to them. RPKI with a strict max length makes such announcements invalid.
Can I enter a single address?
Yes. The tool then shows the most specific announced route that contains it.