البحث عن بادئة BGP
أدخل بادئة (أو عنواناً واحداً). يُجاب من نسختنا اليومية من جدول التوجيه العالمي.
143.69.0.0/16
معلنة كما هي
- 143.69.0.0/16AS721United States Department of Defense (DoD)RPKI غير مُغطّى143.69.0.0
- السجل
- ARIN · الولايات المتحدة · 26/03/1990
- الكتلة المفوَّضة
- 143.69.0.0 – 143.69.255.255
المسارات المغطّية
لا يغطيها أي مسار أقل تحديداً.
المسارات الأكثر تحديداً
- 143.69.7.0/24AS1590United States Department of Defense (DoD)RPKI غير مُغطّى143.69.7.0
- 143.69.8.0/22AS367United States Department of Defense (DoD)RPKI غير مُغطّى143.69.8.0
- 143.69.12.0/23AS367United States Department of Defense (DoD)RPKI غير مُغطّى143.69.12.0
- 143.69.38.0/23AS27064United States Department of Defense (DoD)RPKI غير مُغطّى143.69.38.0
- 143.69.64.0/20AS1540Headquarters, USAISCRPKI غير مُغطّى143.69.64.0
- 143.69.83.0/24AS1540Headquarters, USAISCRPKI غير مُغطّى143.69.83.0
- 143.69.96.0/23AS1540Headquarters, USAISCRPKI غير مُغطّى143.69.96.0
- 143.69.138.0/24AS1493Headquarters, USAISCRPKI غير مُغطّى143.69.138.0
- 143.69.139.0/24AS1493Headquarters, USAISCRPKI غير مُغطّى143.69.139.0
- 143.69.141.0/24AS1493Headquarters, USAISCRPKI غير مُغطّى143.69.141.0
- 143.69.144.0/24AS1493Headquarters, USAISCRPKI غير مُغطّى143.69.144.0
- 143.69.147.0/24AS1493Headquarters, USAISCRPKI غير مُغطّى143.69.147.0
- 143.69.160.0/19AS5972United States Department of Defense (DoD)RPKI غير مُغطّى143.69.160.0
- 143.69.216.0/21AS1590United States Department of Defense (DoD)RPKI غير مُغطّى143.69.216.0
- 143.69.232.0/22AS1590United States Department of Defense (DoD)RPKI غير مُغطّى143.69.232.0
هذا النص غير متوفر بعد باللغة العربية. يُعرض باللغة الإنجليزية إلى أن تُنشر ترجمة.
On the internet, routes are announced as prefixes: an autonomous system tells its neighbours via BGP that it can deliver traffic for, say, 2.48.0.0/14. This tool looks a prefix up in our daily copy of the global routing table and shows three things:
- Exact announcements: which AS originates exactly this prefix. More than one origin (a MOAS) is normal for anycast services and some multihomed networks, and suspicious otherwise.
- Covering routes: less-specific announcements that contain it. Traffic follows the most specific route, so a covering route matters if the more-specific one disappears.
- More-specifics: announcements inside it, which may belong to other networks (customers, or a hijack).
Each announced route is also checked against the RPKI: whether a ROA authorises its origin AS.
The table is the view from APNIC’s route collector. Most of the global table is the same from everywhere, but a route that is filtered before it reaches that collector will not appear.
الأسئلة الشائعة
Why is my /24 not listed but a /16 is?
Your addresses are announced as part of the larger block, and no one announces the /24 separately. That is the normal case for most customers of a provider.
What is a more-specific hijack?
Someone announces a longer prefix inside your space. Because routers prefer the most specific route, traffic goes to them. RPKI with a strict max length makes such announcements invalid.
Can I enter a single address?
Yes. The tool then shows the most specific announced route that contains it.