البحث عن بادئة BGP
أدخل بادئة (أو عنواناً واحداً). يُجاب من نسختنا اليومية من جدول التوجيه العالمي.
116.8.0.0/14
معلنة كما هي
- 116.8.0.0/14AS4134No.31,Jin-rong StreetRPKI صالح116.8.0.0
- السجل
- APNIC · الصين · 22/03/2007
- الكتلة المفوَّضة
- 116.8.0.0 – 116.11.255.255
المسارات المغطّية
لا يغطيها أي مسار أقل تحديداً.
المسارات الأكثر تحديداً
- 116.8.0.0/19AS4809China Telecom Next Generation Carrier NetworkRPKI صالح116.8.0.0
- 116.8.104.0/24AS137693CHINATELECOM Guangxi Nanning IDC networkdescr: Nanning , Guangxi Province, P.R.China.RPKI صالح116.8.104.0
- 116.8.105.0/24AS137693CHINATELECOM Guangxi Nanning IDC networkdescr: Nanning , Guangxi Province, P.R.China.RPKI صالح116.8.105.0
- 116.8.106.0/24AS137693CHINATELECOM Guangxi Nanning IDC networkdescr: Nanning , Guangxi Province, P.R.China.RPKI صالح116.8.106.0
- 116.8.107.0/24AS137693CHINATELECOM Guangxi Nanning IDC networkdescr: Nanning , Guangxi Province, P.R.China.RPKI صالح116.8.107.0
- 116.8.108.0/24AS137693CHINATELECOM Guangxi Nanning IDC networkdescr: Nanning , Guangxi Province, P.R.China.RPKI صالح116.8.108.0
- 116.8.109.0/24AS137693CHINATELECOM Guangxi Nanning IDC networkdescr: Nanning , Guangxi Province, P.R.China.RPKI صالح116.8.109.0
- 116.8.116.0/24AS138169China TelecomRPKI صالح116.8.116.0
- 116.8.117.0/24AS137693CHINATELECOM Guangxi Nanning IDC networkdescr: Nanning , Guangxi Province, P.R.China.RPKI صالح116.8.117.0
- 116.8.118.0/24AS137693CHINATELECOM Guangxi Nanning IDC networkdescr: Nanning , Guangxi Province, P.R.China.RPKI صالح116.8.118.0
- 116.8.119.0/24AS138169China TelecomRPKI صالح116.8.119.0
- 116.8.130.0/23AS138991China TelecomRPKI صالح116.8.130.0
- 116.8.132.0/23AS138991China TelecomRPKI صالح116.8.132.0
- 116.10.48.0/20AS134419BeihaiRPKI صالح116.10.48.0
- 116.10.64.0/20AS134419BeihaiRPKI صالح116.10.64.0
- 116.10.125.0/24AS138169China TelecomRPKI صالح116.10.125.0
- 116.10.184.0/24AS138169China TelecomRPKI صالح116.10.184.0
- 116.10.185.0/24AS138169China TelecomRPKI صالح116.10.185.0
- 116.10.186.0/24AS138169China TelecomRPKI صالح116.10.186.0
- 116.10.187.0/24AS138169China TelecomRPKI صالح116.10.187.0
- 116.10.188.0/24AS138169China TelecomRPKI صالح116.10.188.0
- 116.10.189.0/24AS138169China TelecomRPKI صالح116.10.189.0
- 116.10.190.0/24AS138169China TelecomRPKI صالح116.10.190.0
- 116.10.191.0/24AS138169China TelecomRPKI صالح116.10.191.0
- 116.11.0.0/19AS134419BeihaiRPKI صالح116.11.0.0
- 116.11.32.0/22AS134419BeihaiRPKI صالح116.11.32.0
- 116.11.32.0/24AS134419BeihaiRPKI صالح116.11.32.0
- 116.11.120.0/21AS138991China TelecomRPKI صالح116.11.120.0
- 116.11.120.0/24AS138991China TelecomRPKI صالح116.11.120.0
- 116.11.248.0/24AS138991China TelecomRPKI صالح116.11.248.0
- 116.11.252.0/23AS138169China TelecomRPKI صالح116.11.252.0
- 116.11.254.0/24AS138169China TelecomRPKI صالح116.11.254.0
- 116.11.255.0/24AS138169China TelecomRPKI صالح116.11.255.0
هذا النص غير متوفر بعد باللغة العربية. يُعرض باللغة الإنجليزية إلى أن تُنشر ترجمة.
On the internet, routes are announced as prefixes: an autonomous system tells its neighbours via BGP that it can deliver traffic for, say, 2.48.0.0/14. This tool looks a prefix up in our daily copy of the global routing table and shows three things:
- Exact announcements: which AS originates exactly this prefix. More than one origin (a MOAS) is normal for anycast services and some multihomed networks, and suspicious otherwise.
- Covering routes: less-specific announcements that contain it. Traffic follows the most specific route, so a covering route matters if the more-specific one disappears.
- More-specifics: announcements inside it, which may belong to other networks (customers, or a hijack).
Each announced route is also checked against the RPKI: whether a ROA authorises its origin AS.
The table is the view from APNIC’s route collector. Most of the global table is the same from everywhere, but a route that is filtered before it reaches that collector will not appear.
الأسئلة الشائعة
Why is my /24 not listed but a /16 is?
Your addresses are announced as part of the larger block, and no one announces the /24 separately. That is the normal case for most customers of a provider.
What is a more-specific hijack?
Someone announces a longer prefix inside your space. Because routers prefer the most specific route, traffic goes to them. RPKI with a strict max length makes such announcements invalid.
Can I enter a single address?
Yes. The tool then shows the most specific announced route that contains it.