BGP پریفکس تلاش
ایک پریفکس (یا واحد ایڈریس) درج کریں۔ عالمی روٹنگ ٹیبل کی ہماری روزانہ نقل سے جواب۔
27.152.0.0/13
بالکل اسی شکل میں اعلان شدہ
- 27.152.0.0/13AS4134No.31,Jin-rong StreetRPKI درست27.152.0.0
- رجسٹری
- APNIC · چین · 26 مارچ، 2010
- تفویض شدہ بلاک
- 27.152.0.0 – 27.159.255.255
ڈھانپنے والے روٹس
کوئی کم مخصوص روٹ اسے نہیں ڈھانپتا۔
زیادہ مخصوص روٹس
- 27.152.28.0/23AS133776QuanzhouRPKI درست27.152.28.0
- 27.152.60.0/24AS133776QuanzhouRPKI درست27.152.60.0
- 27.152.180.0/24AS133776QuanzhouRPKI درست27.152.180.0
- 27.152.181.0/24AS133776QuanzhouRPKI درست27.152.181.0
- 27.152.182.0/23AS133776QuanzhouRPKI درست27.152.182.0
- 27.152.184.0/23AS133776QuanzhouRPKI درست27.152.184.0
- 27.152.186.0/23AS133776QuanzhouRPKI درست27.152.186.0
- 27.152.188.0/23AS133776QuanzhouRPKI درست27.152.188.0
- 27.152.190.0/24AS133776QuanzhouRPKI درست27.152.190.0
- 27.152.191.0/24AS133776QuanzhouRPKI درست27.152.191.0
- 27.155.64.0/19AS133774FuzhouRPKI درست27.155.64.0
- 27.155.77.0/24AS133774FuzhouRPKI درست27.155.77.0
- 27.155.78.0/23AS133774FuzhouRPKI درست27.155.78.0
- 27.155.96.0/21AS133774FuzhouRPKI درست27.155.96.0
- 27.155.96.0/24AS133774FuzhouRPKI درست27.155.96.0
- 27.155.104.0/21AS133774FuzhouRPKI درست27.155.104.0
- 27.155.112.0/20AS133774FuzhouRPKI درست27.155.112.0
- 27.156.0.0/20AS133774FuzhouRPKI درست27.156.0.0
- 27.156.26.0/23AS58772CHINANET Fujian province Fuzhou IDC networkRPKI درست27.156.26.0
- 27.156.44.0/23AS4809China Telecom Next Generation Carrier NetworkRPKI درست27.156.44.0
- 27.159.96.0/21AS133775XiamenRPKI درست27.159.96.0
- 27.159.122.0/23AS133774FuzhouRPKI درست27.159.122.0
- 27.159.124.0/22AS133774FuzhouRPKI درست27.159.124.0
یہ متن ابھی اردو میں دستیاب نہیں۔ ترجمہ شائع ہونے تک اسے انگریزی میں دکھایا جاتا ہے۔
On the internet, routes are announced as prefixes: an autonomous system tells its neighbours via BGP that it can deliver traffic for, say, 2.48.0.0/14. This tool looks a prefix up in our daily copy of the global routing table and shows three things:
- Exact announcements: which AS originates exactly this prefix. More than one origin (a MOAS) is normal for anycast services and some multihomed networks, and suspicious otherwise.
- Covering routes: less-specific announcements that contain it. Traffic follows the most specific route, so a covering route matters if the more-specific one disappears.
- More-specifics: announcements inside it, which may belong to other networks (customers, or a hijack).
Each announced route is also checked against the RPKI: whether a ROA authorises its origin AS.
The table is the view from APNIC’s route collector. Most of the global table is the same from everywhere, but a route that is filtered before it reaches that collector will not appear.
اکثر پوچھے جانے والے سوالات
Why is my /24 not listed but a /16 is?
Your addresses are announced as part of the larger block, and no one announces the /24 separately. That is the normal case for most customers of a provider.
What is a more-specific hijack?
Someone announces a longer prefix inside your space. Because routers prefer the most specific route, traffic goes to them. RPKI with a strict max length makes such announcements invalid.
Can I enter a single address?
Yes. The tool then shows the most specific announced route that contains it.